Introduction
Traditional studies of monetary policy's impact on the real economy have focused on its aggregate e®ects. Beginning with Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , modern empirical research in monetary economics emphasizes the ability of policy to stabilize the macroeconomy. But causal observation suggests that business cycles have distributional implications as well. One way of casting the debate over the relative importance of di®erent channels of monetary policy transmission is to ask if these distributional e®ects are su±ciently important to warrant close scrutiny.
The point can be understood clearly by analogy with business cycle research more generally. If recessions were characterized by a proportionate reduction of income across the entire employed population | e.g., everyone worked thirty-nine rather than forty hours per week for a few quarters | then economists would pay substantially less attention to cycles. It is the allocation of the burden or bene¯t of°uctuations, with some individuals facing much larger costs than others, that is of concern. There are two ways for an economist to address this problem. The¯rst is to attempt to stabilize the aggregate economy, the traditional focus of policy-oriented macroeconomics. The second is to ask why the market does not provide some form of insurance.
The recent debate over the nature of the monetary transmission mechanism can be thought of in similar terms. According to the original textbook IS-LM view of money, changes in policy are important only insofar as they a®ect aggregate outcomes. Only the°uctuation in total investment is important since policies only a®ect the required rate of return on new investment projects, and so it is only the least pro¯table projects (economy-wide) that are no longer funded. But since the most pro¯table projects continue to be undertaken, there are no direct e±ciency losses associated with the distributional aspects of the policy induced interest rate increase.
In contrast, the`lending' view focuses on the distributional consequences of monetary policy actions. By emphasizing a combination of capital market imperfections and portfolio balance e®ects based on imperfect asset substitutability, this alternative theory suggests the possibility that the policy's incidence may di®er substantially across agents in the economy. Furthermore, policy's impact has to do with charac-teristics of the individuals that are unrelated to the inherent creditworthiness of the investment projects. An entrepreneur may be deemed unworthy of credit simply because of a currently low net worth, regardless of the social return to the project being proposed. It is important to understand whether the investment declines created by monetary policy shifts have these repercussions.
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In this essay, I examine how one might determine whether the cross-sectional effects of monetary policy are quantitatively important. My goal is to provide a critical evaluation of the major contributions to the literature thus far. The discussion proceeds in three steps. I start in Section 2 with a description of a general framework that encompasses all views of the transmission mechanism as special cases, thereby highlighting the distinctions. In Section 3, I begin a review of the empirical evidence with an assessment of how researchers typically measure monetary policy shifts. The following two sections examine the methods used for di®erentiating between the theories. Studies fall into two broad categories depending on whether they use aggregate or disaggregate data. Section 4 discusses the aggregate data, while Section 5 describes the use of disaggregate data. Section 6 concludes.
Monetary Policy: Theory

A General Framework
One way of posing the fundamental question associated with understanding the monetary transmission mechanism is to ask how seemingly trivial changes in the supply of an outside asset can create large shifts in the gross quantity of assets that are in zero net supply. How is it that small movements in the monetary base (or nonborrowed reserves) translate into large changes in demand deposits, loans, bonds and other securities, thereby a®ecting aggregate investment and output?
The various answers to this puzzle can be understood within the framework originally proposed by Brainard and Tobin (1963) . Their paradigm emphasizes the e®ects of monetary policy on investor portfolios, and is easy to present using the insights from Fama's (1980) seminal paper on the relationship between¯nancial intermediation and central banks.
Fama's view of¯nancial intermediaries is the limit of the current type of¯nancial innovation, as it involves the virtual elimination of banks as depository institutions.
The setup focuses on an investor's portfolio problem in which an individual must choose which assets to hold given the level of real wealth. Labelling the portfolio weight on asset i as w i , and total wealth as W , then the holding of asset i | the asset demand | is just X i = w i W .
In general, the investor is dividing wealth among real assets | real estate, equity and bonds | and outside money. Each asset has stochastic returnz i , with expectation z i ; and the vector of asset returnsz has a covariance structure ¡. Given a utility function, as well as a process for consumption, it is possible to compute the utility maximizing portfolio weights. These will depend on the mean and variance of the returns, z i and ¡, the moments of the consumption process, call these ¹ c , and a vector of taste parameters that I will label Á and assume to be constants. The utility maximizing assets demands can be expressed as
This representation makes clear that asset demands can change for two reasons.
Changes in either the returns process (z; ¡), or macroeconomic quantities (¹ c ; W ), will a®ect the X ¤ i 's.
3
At the most abstract level,¯nancial intermediaries exist to carry out two functions. First, they execute instructions to change portfolio weights. That is to say, following a change in one or all of the stochastic processes driving consumption, wealth, or returns, the intermediary will adjust investors' portfolios so that they continue to maximize utility. In addition, if one investor wishes to transfer some wealth to another for some reason, the intermediary will e®ect the transaction.
What is monetary policy in this stylized setup? For policy to even exist, some government authority, such as a central bank, must be the monopoly supplier of a nominally denominated asset that is imperfectly substitutable with all other assets. I will call this asset`outside money.' In the current environment it is the monetary base. There is a substantial literature on how the demand for outside money arises endogenously in the context of the type of environment I have just described.
4 But in addition, as Fama emphasizes, there may be legal requirements that force agents to use this particular asset for certain transactions. Reserve requirements and the use of reserves for certain types of bank clearings are examples.
Within this stylized setup, a policy action is a change in the nominal supply of this outside money. For such a change to have any e®ects at all, there must be nominal rigidities. Otherwise, a change in the nominal quantity of outside money cannot have any impact on the real interest rate, and will have no real e®ects. But assuming that the policymaker can change the real return on the asset that is monopolistically supplied, investors' portfolio weights must adjust in response to a policy change.
There are several characteristics of this idealized world that are worth mentioning.
First, it is important to emphasize that all that is needed for policy to have an impact is (1) that the central bank control the supply of an asset that is both in demand and for which there is no perfect substitute, and (2) that prices fail to adjust fully and instantaneously. The view of¯nancial intermediaries that is implicit in this description serves to highlight the Brainard and Tobin (1963) insight that monetary policy can be understood by focusing solely on the endogenous response of investor portfolios. Understanding the transmission mechanism requires a characterization of how asset holdings change in response to policy actions.
Second, even though there need be no banks as we know them, there will surely be intermediaries that perform the service of making small business loans. The agency costs and monitoring problems associated with this type of debt will still exist, and specialists in evaluation will emerge. While they will have such loans as assets, they most likely will not have bank deposits as liabilities. Such entities will be brokers, and the loans will be bundled and securitized.
With this as background, it is now possible to sketch the two major views of the monetary transmission mechanism. There are a number of excellent surveys of these theories, including Bernanke (1993) , Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) , Kashyap and Stein (1994a) and Hubbard (1994) . As a result, I will be relatively brief in my descriptions.
The Money View
The¯rst theory, commonly labelled the money view, is based on the notion that reductions in the quantity of outside money raise real rates of return. 5 This, in turn, reduces investment, as there are fewer pro¯table projects available at higher required rates of return | this is a movement along a¯xed marginal e±ciency of investment schedule. The interest rate changes will be larger the less substitutable outside money is for other assets.
There is no real need to discuss banks in this context. In fact, there is no reason to distinguish any of the`other' assets in investors' portfolios. In terms of the simple portfolio model, the money view implies that the shift in the w ¤ i 's for all of the assets excluding outside money are equal.
An important implication of this traditional model of the transmission mechanism involves the incidence of the investment decline. Since there are no externalities or market imperfections, it is only the least socially productive projects that go unfunded. The capital stock is marginally lower. But, given that a decline is going to occur, the allocation of the decline across sectors is socially e±cient. This theory actually points to a measure of money that is rarely studied. Most empirical investigations of monetary policy transmission focus on M2, the logic of the portfolio view suggests that the monetary base is more appropriate. It is also worth pointing out that investigators have found it extremely di±cult to measure economically signi¯cant response of either¯xed or inventory investment to changes in interest rates that are plausibly the result of policy shifts. In fact, most of the evidence that is interpreted as supporting the money view is actually evidence that fails to support the alternative.
The Lending View: Balance-Sheet E®ects
The second theory of monetary transmission is the lending view.
6 It has two parts, one that does not require introduction of assets such as bank loans and one that does. The¯rst is sometimes referred to as the broad lending channel, or¯nancial accelerator, and emphasizes the impact of policy changes on the balance sheets of borrowers. It bears substantial similarity to the mechanism operating in the money view, as it involves the impact of changes in the real interest rate on investment.
According to this view, there are credit market imperfections that make the calculation of the marginal e±ciency of investment schedule more complex. Due to information asymmetries and moral hazard problems, as well as bankruptcy laws, the state of a¯rm's balance sheet has implications for its ability to obtain external nance. Policy induced increases in interest rates (which are both real and nominal)
can cause a deterioration in the¯rm's net worth, by both reducing expected future sales and by increasing the real value of nominally denominated debt. With lower net worth, the¯rm is less creditworthy as it has an increased incentive to misrepresent the riskiness of potential projects. As a result, potential lenders will increase the risk premium they require when making a loan. The asymmetry of information makes internal¯nance of new investment projects cheaper than external¯nance.
The balance-sheet e®ects imply that the shape of the marginal e±ciency of investment curve is itself a function of the debt-equity ratio in the economy and can be a®ected by monetary policy. 7 In terms of a simple textbook analysis, policy moves both the IS and the LM curves. For a given change in the rate of return on outside money (which may be the riskless rate) a lender is less willing to¯nance a given investment the more debt a potential borrower has. This points to two clear distinctions between the money and the lending views | the latter stresses both the distributional impact of monetary policy and explains how seemingly small changes in interest rates can have a large impact on investment (the¯nancial accelerator).
Returning to the portfolio choice model, the presence of credit market imperfections means that policy a®ects the covariance structure of asset returns. As a result, the w ¤ i 's will shift di®erentially in response to monetary tightening as the perceived riskiness of debt issued by¯rms with currently high debt-equity ratios will increase relative to that of others. 
The Lending View: Loans From Intermediaries
The second mechanism articulated by proponents of the lending channel can be described by dividing the`other' assets in investors' portfolios into at least three categories: outside money,`loans' and all the other. Next, assume that there arē rms for whom loans are the only source of external funds | some¯rms cannot issue securities.
9 Depending on the solution to the portfolio allocation problem, a policy action may change both the interest rate and the quantity of loans directly. It is not necessary to have a speci¯c institutional framework in mind to understand this.
Instead, it occurs whenever loans and outside money are complements in investor portfolios; that is, whenever the portfolio weight on loans is a negative function of the return on outside money for given means and covariances of other asset returns.
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The argument has two clear parts. First, there are borrowers who cannot¯nance new projects except through loans, and second, policy changes have a direct e®ect on loan supply. Consequently, the most important impact of a policy innovation is cross-sectional, as it a®ects the quantity of loans to loan-dependent borrowers.
Most of the literature on the lending view focuses on the implications of this mechanism in a world in which banks are the only source of loans and whose liabilities are largely reservable deposits. In this case a reduction in the quantity of reserves forces a reduction in the level of deposits, which must be matched by a fall in loans.
The resulting change in the interest rate on outside money will depend on access to 8 It may be particularly di±cult to distinguish these e®ects from those that arise from varying cyclicality of di®erent¯rms' sales and pro¯tability.
9 See James (1987) for a discussion of the uniqueness of bank loans. 10 With nominal rigidity, a decrease in outside money reduces the price level slowly, and so the real return to holding money increases. This channel of transmission requires that investors shift away from loans in response.
close bank deposit substitutes. But the contraction in bank balance sheets reduces the level of loans. Lower levels of bank loans will only have an impact on the real economy insofar as there are¯rms without an alternative source of investment funds.
As a theoretical matter, it is not necessary to focus narrowly on contemporary banks in trying to understand the di®erent possible ways in which policy actions have real e®ects. As I have emphasized, bank responses to changes in the quantity of reserves are just one mechanism that can lead to a complementarity between outside money and loans. As pointed out by Romer and Romer (1990) , to the extent that there exist ready substitutes in bank portfolios for reservable deposits such as CDs, this speci¯c channel could be weak to nonexistent.
11 But it remains a real possibility that the optimal response of investors to a policy contractions would be to reduce the quantity of loans in their portfolios.
The portfolio choice model also helps to make clear that the manner in which policy actions translate into loan changes need not be a result of loan rationing, although it may. 12 As Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) originally pointed out, a form of rationing may arise in equilibrium as a consequence of adverse selection. But the presence of a lending channel does not require that there be borrowers willing to take on debt at the current price who are not given loans. It arises when there are¯rms who do not have equivalent alternative sources of investment funds and loans are imperfect substitutes in investors' portfolios.
Obviously, the central bank can take explicit actions directed at controlling the quantity of loans. Again, lowering the level of loans will have a di®erential impact that depends on access to¯nancing substitutes. But the mechanism by which explicit credit controls in°uence the real economy is a di®erent question.
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11 Kashyap and Stein (1994b) point out that large banks can issue CDs in a way that insulates their balance sheets from contraction in deposits, but small banks cannot. So long as small banks are an important source of funds for some bank-dependent¯rms, there will still be a bank lending channel. In other words, for bank lending to be an important part of the transmission mechanism, credit market imperfections must be important for banks.
12 Since there must be¯rms that are loan-dependent, there is still some form of rationing in the security market.
13 See Romer and Romer (1993) for a concise discussion of recent episodes in which the Federal Reserve has attempted to change the composition of bank balance sheets through means other than standard policy actions.
Distinguishing the Two Views: General Considerations
Distinguishing between these two views is di±cult as monetary policy actions have two consequences regardless of the relative importance of the money and lending mechanisms. It both lowers current real wealth and changes the portfolio weights.
14 Assuming that there are real e®ects, contractionary actions will reduce future output and lower current real wealth, reducing the demand for all assets. In the context of standard discussions of the transmission mechanism, this is the reduction in investment demand that arises from a cyclical downturn.
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The second e®ect of policy is to change the mean and covariance of expected asset returns. This changes the w it 's. In the simplest case in which there are two assets, outside money and everything else, the increase in the return on outside money will reduce the demand for everything else. This is a reduction in real investment.
The lending view implies that the change in portfolio weights is more complex and in an important way. There may be some combination of balance-sheet and loan supply e®ects.
This immediately suggests that looking at aggregates for evidence of the right degree of imperfect substitutability or timing of changes may be very di±cult. What seems promising is to focus on the other distinction between the two views | the lending view's assumption that some¯rms are dependent on loans for¯nancing.
In addition to di®erences stemming from the relative importance of shifts in loan demand and loan supply, the lending view also predicts cross-section di®erences arising from balance sheet considerations. These are also likely to be testable. In particular, it may be possible to observe whether, given the quality of potential investment projects,¯rms with higher net worth are more likely to obtain external funding.
Again, the major implications are cross-sectional.
14 The change in portfolio weights can arise either from any combination of a change in the return on the outside asset, a change in the covariance structure of returns, or a shift in the consumption process.
15 In general equilibrium there is an o®setting e®ect that arises from the increase in the interest rate. All other things equal, this would increase saving and therefore investment. But we can be fairly con¯dent that so long as monetary policy tightening can cause a recession, the impact of the income and wealth declines will be large enough that investment will fall.
Empirical Evidence: Preliminaries
Before discussing any empirical examination of the monetary transmission mechanism, there are two questions that must be addressed. First, do in fact have real e®ects? Unless monetary policy in°uences the real economy it seems pointless to study the way in which policy changes work. Second, how can we measure monetary policy.? In order to calculate the impact of monetary policy, we need a quantitative measure that can reliably be associated with policy changes.
Here I take up each of these issues. In Section 3.1, I will weigh the evidence on the real e®ects of money. This is followed in Section 3.2 by a discussion of ways in which recent studies have attempted to identify monetary shocks.
The Real E®ects of Nominal Shocks
Modern investigation of the impact of money on real economic activity began with Friedman and Schwartz (1963) . In many ways this is still the most powerful evidence in support of the claim that monetary policy plays an important role in aggregate°uctuations. Through an examination that spanned numerous monetary regimes, they argue that apparently exogenous monetary policy actions preceded output movements.
Recent researchers use more sophisticated statistical tools to study the correlations between money and income. This`money-income causality' literature is largely inconclusive, as it fails to establish convincingly either that money`caused' output or the reverse. In the end, the tests simply establish whether measures of money forecast output, not whether there is causation. Given that outside money | the monetary base | is less than ten percent the size of M2, it is not surprising that economists nd the simultaneity problems inherent in the question too daunting and give up.
Two pieces of evidence seem reasonably persuasive in making the case that money matters. First, the Federal Reserve seems to be able to change the federal funds rate virtually without warning. (I am not arguing that this necessarily a good idea, just that it is possible.) In the very short run, these nominal interest rate changes cannot be associated with changes in in°ationary expectations, and so they must represent real interest rate movements. Such real interest rate changes almost surely have an impact on real resource allocations.
The second piece of evidence comes from the examination of the neutrality of money in Cecchetti (1986 Cecchetti ( , 1987 . In those papers, I establish that output growth is signi¯cantly correlated with money growth at lags of up to ten years! There are several possible interpretations of these¯ndings, but they strongly suggest that monetary shocks have something to do with aggregate real°uctuations. 
Measuring Innovations to Monetary Policy
It stands to reason that before one can study the monetary transmission mechanism it is necessary to identify monetary shocks. A number of authors have argued convincingly that policy disturbances cannot be gauged by examining movements in the monetary aggregates. The reason is that the variance in the innovations to broad measures of money are a combination of endogenous response to real shocks [King and Plosser (1984) ] and shifts in money demand [Bernanke and Blinder (1992) ].
There have been two reactions to the fact that monetary aggregates provide little insight into policy actions. Both begin by looking at the functioning of the Federal Reserve and examining how policy is actually formulated. The¯rst, due to Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , note that the federal funds rates is the actual policy instrument that is used on a day-to-day basis. This suggests that innovations to the federal funds rate are likely to re°ect, at least in part, policy disturbances. The main justi¯cation for their conclusion comes from examining the institutions of how monetary policy is carried out. Romer and Romer (1989) suggest a second method. By reading the minutes of the FOMC meetings, they have constructed a series of dates on which they believe policy became contractionary.
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16 Possibly the most compelling piece of evidence in favor of the real e®ects of monetary policy comes from the fact that, in small open economies, exchange rates move in response to changes in policy.
17 Boschen and Mills (1992) describe a related technique. In order to understand the shortcomings of these two approaches, I will describe how each is used. In the¯rst, researchers begin by specifying a vector autoregression.
For the purposes of the example, I will use the formulation in Bernanke and Blinder's (1992) Section IV. They employ a six-variable speci¯cation with the total civilian unemployment rate, the log of the CPI, the federal funds rate, and the log of three bank balance sheet measures, all in real terms: deposits, securities and loans. The assumption is that the federal funds rate is a`policy' variable, and so it is una®ected by all other contemporaneous innovations. 
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The second¯gure shows the response of the log of the CPI to a one percentage point innovation in the federal funds rate. To understand how this is computed, begin by writing the vector autoregression as
where A(L) is a matrix of polynomials in the lag operator L (L i y t´yt¡i ), y t is the vector of variables used in the estimation, and ² t is mean zero independent (but potentially heteroskedastic) error. The¯rst step is to estimate the reduced form version of (1) 
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But the point estimate of the impulse response function is not really enough to allow us to reach solid conclusions. It is also important to construct con¯dence interthe data. 20 This entire discussion ignores the possibility that anticipated monetary policy matters. Something that researchers should consider bringing into the discussion.
21 A simple way to calculate the vector moving average form of (1) is to construct the companion form of the VAR as described in Sargent (1987, pg. 309) . This is also discussed in Hamilton (1994) . 22 To avoid making such stringent assumptions, I choose to estimate con¯dence bands using an alternative technique grounded in classical statistics.
The delta method is the simple procedure that comes from noting that if the estimates of the coe±cients in lag polynomials are asymptotically normally distributed, then any well-behaved function of these parameters will also be asymptotically normally distributed. Stacking all of the parameters in A(L) and calling the result µ,
It follows that any function of these parameters f (µ) | e.g. the impulse response function | will be asymptotically normally distributed
22 See Doan (1990) Chapter 10.1.
which can be estimated numerically.
The result plotted in Figure 2 was¯rst pointed out by Sims and is known as the`price puzzle.' Paradoxically, the VAR estimates imply that monetary policy contractions lead to price increases! As is clear from the estimated standard-error bands, this price rise is signi¯cantly positive for approximately the¯rst year. After two years, however, it is not possible to reject that the hypothesis that a funds rate increase has no e®ect on the price level.
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The standard conclusion is that the VAR is misspecifed in some way. One strong possibility is that the funds rate is not exogenous in the way that is required for this identi¯cation to be valid, and so these innovations do not accurately re°ect policy movements.
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My conclusions may be too harsh for the following reason. As Ben Bernanke pointed out in the conference, the estimated innovations are the sum of true policy innovation, policy responses to omitted variables, and more general speci¯cation errors in the VAR. As a result, one would expect them to be noisy. Furthermore, as pointed out by Adrian Pagan, since one is primarily interested in is the impulse response functions | the impact of unanticpated policy on output, prices and the like | then it may be immaterial that the estimated policy innovations are noisy even if the true innovations are not. Finally,
The Romer and Romer Dates
The Romer and Romer dates have been both widely used and extensively criticized.
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They su®er from both technical and substantive problems. First, they are discrete.
23 A test for whether all of the reactions are jointly zero rejects at the 5-percent level for the¯rst seven months, and then fails to reject. The test for whether all the e®ects are zero simultaneously for all twenty-four months fails to reject with a p-value of 0.77.
24 There is a further reason to view this measure of policy with some skepticism. Because of the large number of parameters estimated, the regressions are usually over¯tted. As a result, they normally have very poor out-of-sample forecasting properties.
25 See Friedman (1990) for a discussion of the strategy of using policymakers' statements to gauge their actions. Taking a slightly di®erent approach Shapiro (1994) examines whether the FOMC is responding to changes in economic conditions, and so there is some reaction function implicit in policy. He estimates a probit model for the Romer and Romer dates using measures of in°ation and unemployment, both as deviations from a carefully constructed target level, as determinants. Figure 3 reproduces his estimates of the probability of a date, with the vertical lines representing the dates themselves. The unanticipated policy action is one minus the estimated probability. As is clear from the¯gure, several of the dates were largely anticipated, and there were some periods when policy shifts were thought to be likely, and then did not occur. Overall, Shapiro's results suggest that the standard interpretation of the dummy variables as exogenous is incorrect to varying degrees over time.
There seems to be no way to measure monetary policy actions that does not raise serious objections. Given this, it might seem di±cult to see how to can proceed with the study of di®erent theories of the transmission mechanism. But the literature proceeds in two directions. The¯rst uses these measures directly in an attempt to gauge the in°uence of policy changes directly. The conclusions of these studies must be viewed with some degree of skepticism. The alternative approach is to note that investment declines account for the major share of output reductions during recessions. If one is able to show that the distribution of the contraction in investment is correlated with variables related to a¯rm's balance sheet and its access to bank 
Using Aggregate Data
Numerous studies have used aggregate data in an attempt to distinguish the channels of monetary transmission. This literature can be divided into three categories:
The¯rst looks at the relative forecasting ability of di®erent quantity aggregates, the second studies di®erences in the timing of the response of aggregate quantities to presumed policy shocks, and the third examines the behavior of interest rates.
Before examining the work on quantities, I will discuss the use of interest rate data. 26 As is clear from the discussion in Section 2, the lending view does allow for movements in market interest rates. Furthermore, these movements are in the same direction as the those predicted by the money view, and their magnitude depends solely on the degree of substitutability between outside money and various other 26 Miron, Romer and Weil (1994) study pre-World War II interest rates in an attempt to address these questions.
assets. Where the two views di®er is in their predictions for movements in the interest rate on loans. But since there is currently no secondary market for these securities, it is impossible to determine the interest rate on these loans.
27 This implies that market interest rates are of virtually no use in this exercise. There is no sense is which the behavior of interest rates could serve to distinguish between the money or lending views.
I now turn to the work on quantities. In Section 4.1, I examine tests involving the relative forecasting ability of measures of money and credit. This is followed in Section 4.2 by a discussion of papers that emphasize aggregate timing relationships.
Relative Forecasting Ability
A number of papers have examined the ability of di®erent¯nancial aggregates to forecast output (or unemployment)°uctuations. Ramey (1993) is a recent example.
The main methodology here is to ask whether measures of credit are informative about future output movements, once money has been taken into account. The problem with this is that credit is usually just a broader measure of money. To put it slightly di®erently, the balance-sheet identity of the banking system implies that bank assets equal bank liabilities. As Bernanke (1993b) points out, monetary aggregates are a measure of bank liabilities, while credit aggregates are measures of bank assets.
Since these are calculated slightly di®erently, they will not be identical. But it is these technical measurement di®erences that are likely to account for the di®erences in forecasting ability, not anything about the transmission mechanism.
More generally, the main¯nding is that credit lags output. Unfortunately, this tells us nothing about the transmission mechanism. The aggregate data do show that aggregate credit is countercyclical, but it is easy to¯nd explanations for this that are consistent with the lending view. For example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1993) present a model in which individuals must continue to service credit even after income falls, and so credit falls after income even though it is the fundamental source of°uctuations.
In the end, it is di±cult to see how aggregate timing relationships can tell us anything at all about the way in which monetary policy a®ects real activity. 
Aggregate Timing Relationships
The second use of aggregate data has been to examine the response of various nancial quantities to policy innovations. Returning to Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , they study whether bank loans and securities respond di®erently to federal funds rate innovations. 29 The standard methodology is to calculate the impulse responses for the two variables and note that they look di®erent. Figure 4 reports the common nding, calculated using the six-variable Bernanke and Blinder VAR estimated over the 1959 to 1990 sample. In response to a positive one-percentage point innovation in the federal funds rate, the unemployment rate rises by nearly 0.1 after one and one-half years, while bank securities fall 0.07 percent and loans decline 0.02 percent.
Securities fall both by a larger amount and more quickly than loans.
But point estimates of these impulse responses do not tell the entire story. In Figure 5 , I plot the point estimate and two standard error bands for the di®erence between the impulse response for loans and securities. This allows an explicit test of whether these two assets are imperfectly substitutable in response to the shock.
The di®erences are individually greater than zero in only a few months, and a joint test of the¯rst twenty-four months of the impulse response, which is asymptotically distributed as a Chi-squared, has a p-value of 0.70.
My conclusion is that reduced-form vector autoregressions are nearly incapable of providing convincing evidence that there is a di®erential impact of federal funds rate innovations on various parts of bank balance sheets. These results are based on the estimation of a large number of parameters with a relatively small amount of data | this VAR has 237 parameters and 354 data points | and so the estimates are fairly imprecise.
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28 This point is also made by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) . 29 Morgan (1992) and Strongin (1991) are also examples of this type of work. 30 I have tried two variants of the Bernanke and Blinder VAR method that might seem promising ways of addressing the problem of measuring monetary policy changes. In the¯rst, I substituted the funds rate target as reported in Sellon (1994) for the actual funds rate. This has very little impact on 
Horizon in Months
But even if one were to¯nd that the impulse responses di®ered signi¯cantly, this would only bear on the substitutability of the assets, and not directly on the validity of the lending view. Both the prices and quantities of perfect substitutes must have the same stochastic process, and so¯nding that this particular partial correlation is di®erent would be evidence of imperfect substitutability. As Bernanke and Blinder (1992) make clear in their discussion of their¯ndings, this is a necessary but not a su±cient condition for the results of the lending view to obtain. It is not possible, using reduced-form estimates based on aggregate data alone, to identify whether bank balance sheet contractions are caused by shifts in loan supply or loan demand. What is needed is a variable that is known to shift one curve but not the other. Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) also provide evidence based on aggregate timing. They compare the response of bank loans to that of commercial paper issuance following policy innovations. They¯nd that monetary policy contractions seem to decrease the mix of loans relative to commercial paper. Borrowers that can move away from direct bank¯nance following a tightening appear to do so. Both Friedman and Kuttner (1993) , and Oliner and Rudebusch (1993) take issue with these¯ndings and show that changes in the mix are due to increases in the amount of commercial paper issuance during a recession, but that the quantity of bank loans does not change. In addition, Oliner and Rudebusch show that once¯rm size is taken into account, and trade credit is included in the debt of the small¯rms, the mix of¯nancing is left una®ected by policy changes.
It is worth making an additional point about the commercial paper market. First, Post (1992) documents that all commercial paper that is rated by a rating agency must have a backup source of liquidity, which is generally a bank line of credit or a standby letter of credit. This means that commercial paper is an indirect liability of banks, albeit one that is not on their balance sheet. Furthermore, Calomiris, the results, as the Fed comes extremely close to hitting the targets. Second, I made the alternative extreme assumption that the funds rate itself is exogenous. This has very dramatic e®ects on the results, as Bernanke and Blinder's conclusions are completely unsupported. If all movements in the funds rate are assumed to represent exogenous policy actions, it would be extremely di±cult to claim that loans and securities responded di®erently to policy shifts. Himmelberg and Wachtel (1994) suggest that increases in commercial paper issuance are accompanied by an increase in trade credit. This means that a policy contraction may simply cause a re-shu²ing of credit by forcing banks to move liabilities o® of their balance sheet such that large¯rms issue commercial paper in order to provide trade credit to small¯rms that would have otherwise come from banks.
Using Cross-Sectional Data
There is a large empirical literature using cross-sectional data that is relevant to understanding the channels of monetary policy. These studies fall into groups that separately address the two parts of the lending view. The¯rst set of papers tries to gauge the importance of capital market imperfections on investment, and so is related to the balance-sheet e®ects described in Section 2.3. The second set, which is fairly small, examine time-series variation in cross-sectional data in an attempt to characterize the distributional e®ects of monetary policy directly. I will brie°y describe each of these strategies.
Measuring Capital Market Imperfections
The literature on capital market imperfections is an outgrowth of the vast work done on the determinants of investment. The general¯nding in this literature is that internal¯nance is less costly than external¯nance for¯rms that have poor access to primary capital markets.
The empirical studies fall into two categories. The¯rst examines reduced-form correlations while the second looks directly at the relationship between the cost and expected return to a marginal investment project | they estimate structural`Euler equations.'
Reduced-Form Correlations
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) pioneered the technique of dividing¯rm-level data into groups using measures thought to correspond to the project monitoring costs created by information asymmetries, and then seeing if the correlation between investment and cash-°ow measures varies across the groups. The¯nding in a wide range of studies is that investment is more sensitive to cash-°ow variables for¯rms who have ready access to outside sources of funds.
31
The main issue in interpreting these results is whether the characteristics of thē rm used to split the sample are exogenous to¯nancing decisions. Measures of¯rm size, dividend policies, bond ratings and the like may be related to the quality of investment projects a¯rm has available, and so lender discrimination may not be a consequence of asymmetric information.
There are several examples in which researchers identify potentially constrained rms based on institutional characteristics, and so the endogeneity problems are mitigated. I will mention two. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) ¯nd that investment by Japanese¯rms that were members of a keiretsu, or industrial group, was not in°uenced by liquidity e®ects. Using data on individual hospitals, Calem and Rizzo (1994) ¯nd that investment depends more heavily on cash-°ow variables for small single unit hospitals than for large network a±liated ones.
In the most convincing study of this type, Calomiris and Hubbard (forthcoming) study the undistributed corporate pro¯ts tax in 1936 and 1937 to estimate the di®er-ences in¯nancing costs directly from¯rms' responses to the institution of a graduated surtax intended to force an increase in the dividend payout rate. Their results are that, holding investment opportunities¯xed, investment spending is a®ected by the level of internal funds only for those¯rms with low levels of dividend payments and high marginal tax rates. Furthermore, these tended to be smaller and faster growinḡ rms.
Structural Estimation
The neoclassical theory of investment allows one to derive the complex equilibrium relationship among the capital stock, rates of return, future marginal value products and project costs that form the¯rst-order-conditions for a¯rm's problem. With the appropriate data, it is then possible to see whether these`Euler equations' hold. Hubbard and Kashyap (1992) is an interesting use of this technique. Following the work 31 Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) survey the large number of studies that use this approach.
of Zeldes (1989) on consumption, they examine whether the ability of agricultural rms to meet this¯rst-order-condition depends on the extent of their collaterizable net worth. They¯nd that during periods when farmers have high net worth, and so they have better access to external¯nancing, their investment behavior is more likely to look as if it is unconstrained. These investment studies have been very successful in establishing the existence of capital market imperfections as well as their likely source in information asymmetries arising from monitoring problems. While the work has little to say about monetary policy directly, it does provide an excellent characterization of the distributional e®ects of changes in the health of¯rms' balance sheets regardless of the source.
Time-series Evidence
The strategy in the second set of studies is to use the cross-sectional dimension to identify the transmission mechanism. The goal is to determine whether the reduction in loans during monetary contractions is a consequence of shifts in loan demand or loan supply. My conclusion is that these studies fail to establish the desired result in a convincing way. Instead, they provide further evidence of capital market imperfections.
Three major studies use data on manufacturing¯rms. In the¯rst. Gertler and Hubbard (1988) ¯nd that the impact of cash-°ow on investment is higher during recessions for¯rms that retain a high percentage of their earnings. The second, by Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1993) , shows that during the 1981{82 recession the inventories of¯rms without ready access to external¯nance fell by more when their initial level of internal cash was lower. On the other hand, the inventory investment behavior of¯rms with ready access to primary capital markets showed no evidence of liquidity constraints. In the third, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) use the Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations (QFR) to divide¯rms into assetsize categories and¯nd that small¯rms account for a disproportionate share of the decline in manufacturing following a monetary shock.
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Both Kashyap and Stein (1994b) and Peek and Rosengren (forthcoming) focus on the behavior of lenders rather than borrowers. By examining the cyclical behavior of banks, Kashyap and Stein hope to¯nd evidence for the importance of loan supply shifts. The strongest result in the paper is that following a monetary contraction the total quantity of loans held by small banks falls while that of large banks does not. By contrast, Peek and Rosengren study New England banks during the 1990-91 recession and¯nd that poorly capitalized banks shrink by more that equivalent institutions with higher net worth. My interpretation is that both of these show that the capital market imperfections commonly found to apply to manufacturing¯rms apply to banks as well.
There are two di±culties inherent in any attempt to establish that the important transmission mechanism for monetary policy shocks is through bank loan supply shifts. First, as described at length in Section 3.2, there is the problem of empirically identifying monetary policy. Beyond this, there is the subtlety of distinguishing loan supply shifts from the balance-sheet e®ects. Is the observed reduction in loans a consequence of their complementarity with outside money caused by the structure of the banking system, or is it the result of changes in the shape of the marginal e±cient of investment schedule brought on by the balance-sheet e®ects? Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1993) suggest one possible way of distinguishing these possibilities. If one can nd a recessionary period that was not preceded by a monetary contraction, and show that interest rates rose but that bank dependence was irrelevant to individual¯rms' experiences, this would mean that banks are responsible for the distributional e®ects induced by monetary shocks. Unfortunately, such evidence is not readily available.
Conclusion
After surveying the work that attempts to distinguish theories of the monetary transmission mechanism where do we stand? My conclusion is that the myriad of studies have succeeded in establishing the empirical importance of credit market imperfections. This means that monetary policy shifts have an important distributional aspect that cannot be addressed within the traditional money view. It is the smaller and faster growing¯rms that bear a disproportionate share of the burden imposed by a recession. Since these are likely to be¯rms with investment opportunities that are highly pro¯table, this has important implications for social welfare. Not only are recessions associated are with aggregate output and investment declines, but the declines are ine±cient.
Beyond this, there is the issue of distinguishing the two parts of the lending view.
Do we care if we can distinguish changes in investment opportunities resulting from nancial accelerator e®ects from bank loan supply shifts per se? Does the conclusion have implications for the actual conduct of monetary policy? I believe that the answer is yes. If the complementarity of bank loans and outside money arises largely as a result of the¯nancial regulatory environment, then, with¯nancial innovation and liberalization, these e®ects are likely to become less important over time. With the introduction of interstate banking and the development of more sophisticated instruments aimed at trading pools of loans, it is only the balance-sheet e®ects that will remain. As a result, it is important to know which is the more important channel of monetary policy transmission.
